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Misbranding and the Opportunity to Cure Under the 
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act 
Kevin C. Kennedy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the eight years since enactment of Title I of the Petroleum 
Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA" or "the Act") in 1978,1. federal 
courts have had a number of opportunities to rule on the legality of 
termination and nonrenewal of retail gasoline dealer franchises under 
the PMP A. 2 The Act limits the grounds on which an oil franchisor 
may base termination or refusal to renew a retail dealer's franchise,3 
generally prohibiting termination or nonrenewal except for good 
cause.· In this respect, the PMPA is closely aligned with earlier fed-
eral legislation regulating automobile dealer franchising. ~ 
When a terminating event does occur, the question arises whether 
the dealer-franchisee must first be afforded an opportunity to cure its 
failure to adhere to the provisions of the franchise agreement before 
the franchise may be terminated. This article examines the question 
of termination for misbranding and opportunity for cure under the 
PMP A. Its special focus is on two recent conflicting opinions of the 
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida. J.D. 
1977, Wayne State University School of Law; LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. 
1 Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (1982). The Petroleum Market-
ing Practices Act ("PMPA") has three titles. Title II, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2821-2824 (1982), deals with 
octane ratings. Title III, 15 U.S.C. § 2841 (1982), deals with motor fuel subsidization. These two 
Titles are beyond the scope of this article. 
• See, e.g., Sun Refining & Marketing Co. v. Raga, 741 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1984); Roberts v. 
Amoco Oil Co., 740 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1984); Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 
1984); Lewis v. Exxon Corp., U.S.A., 716 F.2d 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Humboldt Oil, Inc. v. 
Exxon Co., U.S.A., 695 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1982); Palmieri v. Mobil Oil Corp., 682 F.2d 295 (2d 
Cir. 1982); Thompson v. Kerr-McGee Refining Corp., 660 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982). 
• 15 U.S.C. § 2802 (1982). 
• Id. See Kostantas v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 663 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1981) (the PMPA does not 
create a permanent estate of inheritance in the franchise). 
• See Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1982). See generally 
Macauley, Changing a Continuing Relationship Between a Large Corporation and Those Who 
Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers and the Legal System, Hi65 WIS. L. 
REV. 740; Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE 
L.J. 1135 (1957). 
241 
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Seventh and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals which address this 
question.6 . 
11 BACKGROUND OF THE PETROLEUM MARKETING PRACTICES ACT 
In June 1978, Congress passed the Petroleum Marketing Practices 
Act,7 creating minimum substantive and procedural standards for the 
termination and nonrenewal of retail gasoline dealer franchises. Out 
of a perceived need to protect franchisees from arbitrary and discrim-
inatory termination and nonrenewal of their franchises,8 Congress 
prohibited franchisors from terminating a franchise during the term 
of the franchise agreement9 and from failing to renew a franchise 
upon its expiration.10 If, however, the termination or nonrenewal is 
based upon one of the grounds specified in the Actll and is executed 
in accordance with the Act's notice requirements,12 the termination is 
valid. The statutory grounds for franchise termination are: (1) a fail-
ure by the franchisee to comply with any reasonable and material 
provision of the franchise;13 (2) a failure by the franchisee to exert 
• Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1985); Wisser Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 730 
F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1984). 
7 PMPA, supra note 1. For an excellent discussion of Title I of the PMPA, see Comment, 
Retail Gasoline Franchise Terminations and Nonrenewals Under Title I of the Petroleum 
Marketing Practices Act, 1980 DUKE L.J. 522 [hereinafter cited as Retail Gasoline Franchise 
Terminations]; Note, Petroleum Marketing Practices Act: Equalizing the Bargaining Power in 
the Franchise Relationship, 25 S.D.L. REV. 69 (1980). See also O'Brien, Federal Laws Affect-
ing the Right of a Franchisor to Terminate or Not Renew a Franchise: Petroleum Marketing 
Practices Act, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1371 (1980); Finch, Judicial Interpretation of the Petroleum 
Marketing Practices Act: Strict Construction of Remedial Legislation, 37 Bus. LAW. 141 
(1981); Jordan, Unconscionability at the Gas Station, 62 MINN. L. REV. 813 (1978); Comment, 
Adjusting the Equities in Franchise Termination: A Sui Generis Approach, 30 CLEVE. ST. L. 
REV. 523, 548-54 (1981). See generally Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights 
- Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465; Hewitt, Good Faith or Unconscionability -
Franchisee Remedies for Termination, 29 Bus. LAW. 227 (1973). 
• See S. Rep. No. 731, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 873, 874 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 731]. 
• 15 U.S.C. § 2802(a)(1). 
,. Id. § 2802(a)(2). 
11 [d. § 2802(b)(2) . 
.. Id. § 2804 . 
.. [d. § 2802(b)(2)(A). This section provides: 
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the following are grounds for termination of a 
franchise or nonrenewal of a franchise relationship: 
(A) A failure by the franchisee to comply with any provision of the franchise, 
which provision is both reasonable and of material significance to the franchise 
relationship, if the franchisor first acquired actual or constructive knowledge of 
such failure -
(i) not more than 120 days prior to the date on which notification of 
termination or nonrenewal is given, if notification is given pursuant to section 
104(a) [15 U.S.C. § 2804(a)]; or 
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good faith efforts to carry out the provisions of the franchise after 
prior warning by the franchisor of such failure;H (3) the occurrence of 
an event which is relevant to the franchise relationship and which 
makes franchise termination reasonable;lli (4) a written agreement to 
(ii) not more than 60 days prior to the date on which notification of 
termination or nonrenewal is given, if less than 90 days notification is given 
pursuant to section 104(b)(l) [15 U.S.C. § 2804(b)(I)]. 
I. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(B). This section provides that a franchise may be terminated or not 
renewed for: 
[a] failure by the franchisee to exert good faith efforts to carry out the provisions of 
the franchise, if -
(i) the franchisee was apprised by the franchisor in writing of such failure and 
was afforded a reasonable opportunity to exert good faith efforts to carry out such 
provisions; and 
(ii) such failure thereafter continued within the period which began not more 
than 180 days before the date notification of termination or nonrenewal was given 
pursuant to section 104 [15 U.S.C. § 2804]. 
I. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(C). This section permits franchise termination upon: 
[t]he occurrence of an event which is relevant to the franchise relationship and as a 
result of which termination of the franchise or nonrenewal of the franchise relation-
ship is reasonable, if such event occurs during the period the franchise is in effect and 
the franchisor first acquired actual or constructive knowledge of such occurrence -
(i) not more than 120 days prior to the date on which notification of termi-
nation or non renewal is given, if notification is given pursuant to section 104(a) 
[15 U.S.C. § 2804(a)]; or 
(ii) not more than 60 days prior to the date on which notification of termi-
nation or nonrenewal is given, if less than 90 days notification is given pursuant to 
section 104(b)(l) [15 U.S.C. § 2804(b)(1)]. 
15 U.S.C. § 2802(c) provides an illustrative list of twelve events which are considered relevant 
to the franchise relationship and as a result of which franchise termination or nonrenewal is 
deemed reasonable: 
(1) fraud or criminal misconduct by the franchisee relevant to the operation of the 
marketing premises; 
(2) declaration of bankruptcy or judicial determination of insolvency of the 
franchisee; 
(3) continuing severe physical or mental disability of the franchisee of at least 3 
months duration which renders the franchisee unable to provide for the contin-
ued proper operation of the marketing premises; 
(4) loss of the franchisor's right to grant possession of the leased marketing prem-
ises through expiration of an underlying lease ... ; 
(5) condemnation or other taking ... of the marketing premises pursuant to the 
power of eminent domain; 
(6) loss of the franchisor's right to grant the right to use the trademark which is the 
subject of the franchise ... ; 
(7) destruction... of . . . the marketing premises; 
(8) failure by the franchisee to pay to the franchisor in a timely manner when due 
all sums to which the franchisor is legally entitled; 
(9) failure by the franchisee to operate the marketing premises for -
(A) 7 consecutive days, or 
(B) such lesser period which under the facts and circumstances constitutes an 
unreasonable period of time; 
(10) willful adulteration, mislabeling or misbranding of motor fuels or other trade-
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terminate the franchise;16 and (5) a good faith determination by the 
franchisor to withdraw its business from the geographic area. 17 The 
grounds for franchise nonrenewal include all of the grounds for 
franchise termination,18 plus (1) the failure to agree to franchise 
changes or additional provisions proposed by the franchisor in good 
faith and in the normal course of business;19 (2) numerous customer 
complaints of which the franchisee is promptly apprised and, if they 
relate to the condition of the premises or employee conduct, which 
the franchisee does not promptly cure;20 (3) a failure to operate the 
premises in a clean, safe, and healthful manner on two or more previ-
ous occasions of which the franchisee was notified by the franchisor;21 
and (4) a good faith determination by the franchisor to sell, materi-
ally alter, or convert the premises to a use other than the sale of 
motor fueJ.22 Time limitations are imposed to preclude a franchisor 
from basing termination or nonrenewal on "old and long forgotten 
events."23 According to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natu-
ral Resources, "[t]hese provisions strike a balance between the at 
times conflicting interests of the parties to the relationship."2. 
In the past, franchisors were able to exact highly preferential 
franchise termination provisions.21i The PMP A was thus born out of a 
concern that retail gasoline dealers suffered a disparity of bargaining 
power,26 resulting in franchise agreements which were little better 
than contracts of adhesion.27 At the same time, however, Congress 
recognized that franchisors too have a legitimate need to be able to 
mark violations by the franchisee; 
(11) knowing failure of the franchisee to comply with federal, state, or local laws or 
regulations relevant to the operation of the marketing premises; and 
(12) conviction of the franchisee of any felony involving moral turpitude. 
'8 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(D). 
17 [d. § 2802(b)(2)(E) . 
.. [d. § 2802(b)(2)(AHE). 
'8 [d. § 2802(b)(3)(A) . 
•• [d. § 2802(b)(3)(B). 
11 [d. § 2802(b)(3)(C) . 
.. [d. § 2802(b)(3)(D) . 
• a S. REP. No. 731, supra note 8, at 892. As noted in the Senate report, "the time limitations , 
are not intended to stop a franchisor from exercising termination or non-renewal rights based 
upon a future event which constitutes a ground for termination or non-renewal, even if such 
future event is a repeat occurrence of an event with respect to which the previous exercise of 
termination or non-renewal rights was waived." [d. at 892 . 
.. [d. at 874 . 
•• [d. at 876-77 . 
•• [d. at 875-76. See also Retail Gasoline Franchise Terminations, supra note 7, at 524-31. 
H S. REP. No. 731, supra note 8, at 875-76. 
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terminate or not renew a franchise relationship;28 this is especially 
true where the franchisee has committed an egregious breach of the 
franchise agreement29 or where circumstances have appreciably 
changed. so As noted, the PMP A establishes a general prohibition 
against termination of any motor fuel franchise,sl but it does permit 
termination under certain circumstances. S2 The extent to which the 
Act affords a franchisee the opportunity to cure defaults under the 
franchise agreement is the focus of the following section. 
III. THE OPPORTUNITY TO CURE UNDER THE PMPA 
Three of the five enumerated grounds for franchise termination 
contained in the PMPAsS contemplate that, prior to actual termina-
tion, the franchisor and franchisee first attempt to work out a mutu-
ally satisfactory solution to the situation which triggered the notice 
of termination. S4 These three grounds are: the failure of the fran-
chisee to comply with a franchise provision which is both reasonable 
and of material significance to the franchise relationship;31i the failure 
of the franchisee to exert good faith efforts to carry out the provi-
sions of the franchise;38 and the occurrence of an event relevant to 
the franchise as a result of which termination is reasonable.37 Specific 
noticeS8 and time limitations39 are imposed on a franchisor's termina-
tion under each of these three grounds. According to the Senate: 
The time limitations are designed to provide adequate opportunity 
for a franchisor to evaluate the potential grounds for franchise ter-
mination. . . prior to making a determination whether to terminate 
the franchise . . . . Flexibility is provided so that a franchisor may 
work with a franchisee in an effort to correct the situation and avoid 
termination of the franchise . 40 
2. Id. at 876 . 
•• Id. at 877. 
30 Id. 
OJ 15 U.S.C. § 2802(a); S. REp. No. 731, supra note 8, at 892 . 
•• 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b) . 
•• See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text . 
.. By their nature, neither the parties' mutual agreement to terminate the franchise under 15 
U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(D), nor the franchisor's good faith decision to withdraw its business from 
the geographic area under 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(E), contemplates an opportunity on the part 
of the franchisee to cure . 
•• 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(A) . 
.. Id. § 2802(b)(2)(B). 
37 Id. § 2802(b)(2)(C) . 
.. Id. § 2804 . 
•• Id. §§ 2802(b)(2)(A), (B), & (C). 
4. S. REP. No. 731, supra note 8, at 892-93. 
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In light of this legislative history, the question arises whether a 
franchisor must afford a franchisee the opportunity to cure in the 
three instances of franchise termination permitted under 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2802(b)(2)(A), (B), and (C). As the following discussion shows, the 
structure of the PMP A indicates that the answer is "no" in the case 
of terminations under sections 2802(b)(2)(A) and 2802(b)(2)(C), but 
that such an opportunity must be provided if franchise termination is 
based on section 2802(b)(2)(B). 
First, a franchise may be terminated under section 2802(b)(2)(A) 
for a failure by the franchisee to comply with any provision of the 
franchise agreement (upon giving timely notice of such termination), 
so long as the franchise provision is reasonable and of material signif-
icance to the franchise relationship.41 In addition, termination on 
such a ground cannot be based on a franchisee's noncompliance when 
the franchisor had actual or constructive knowledge more than 120 
days prior to the date on which notification of termination is given.42 
Nothing in the Act expressly grants the franchisee the opportunity to 
cure a default. 
Second, in connection with section 2802(b)(2)(C), a franchisee may 
have its franchise terminated based upon "[t]he occurrence of an 
event which is relevant to the franchise relationship and as a result of 
which termination of the franchise . . . is reasonable . . . . "43 
Franchise termination under this subsection is subject to the same 
notice and time limitation restrictions as those contained in section 
2802(b)(2)(A).44 Events which are deemed relevant to the franchise 
relationship and which make termination permissible are defined in 
section 2802(c).4& They include criminal conduct by the franchisee re-
lating to the operation of the franchise46 or involving moral turpi-
tude;47 a declaration of bankruptcy by the franchisee;48 and willful 
adulteration, mislabeling or misbranding of motor fuels or other 
., 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(A). See supra note 13 . 
•• [d. § 2802(b)(2)(A)(i). This provision is designed to prevent a franchisor from resurrecting 
stale events as a ground for termination. See S. REP. No. 731, supra note 8, at 892. This 120-day 
limitation period is shortened to 60 days if less than 90·days notification of termination is given 
the franchisee pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2804(b)(I). Ordinarily, 90-days notice of termination is 
required under 15 U.S.C. § 2804(a)(2). However, such advance notice may be shortened "[i)n 
circumstances in which it would not be reasonable for the franchisor to furnish notification." 15 
U.S.C. § 2804(b)(I) . 
•• 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(C). See supra note 15 . 
•• [d. Compare supra note 13 with note 15 . 
•• See supra note 15 . 
•• 15 U.S.C. § 2802(c)(I). 
47 [d. § 2802(c)(12) . 
•• [d. § 2802(c)(2). 
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trademark violations by the franchisee. 49 As is the case with section 
2802(b)(2)(A) terminations; section 2802(b)(2)(C) on its face does not 
permit the franchisee an opportunity to cure the defect in the event 
of franchise termination. 
By contrast, section 2802(b)(2)(B) contemplates that a franchisee 
will be afforded an opportunity to cure. That section provides that a 
franchise may be terminated for "[a] failure by the franchisee to ex-
ert good faith efforts to carry out the provisions of the franchise, if 
. : . the franchisee was apprised by the franchisor in writing of such 
failure and was afforded a reasonable opportunity to exert good 
faith efforts to carry out such provisions . ... "1i0 In addition, termi-
nation on this ground cannot be based on any purported failure to 
exert good faith efforts which is more than 180 days old. iiI On its face 
then, section 2802(b)(2)(B) envisions an opportunity to cure by the 
franchisee. Whether sections 2802(b)(2)(A) or 2802(b)(2)(C) likewise 
extend the same opportunity to the franchisee has been the subject 
of recent litigation. 
In one of the first cases to consider the PMP A, Gilderhus v. Amoco 
Oil CO.,1i2 the district court read into the Act a policy of providing 
franchisees with" 'meaningful protection from arbitrary or discrimi-
natory terminations.' "1i3 Given this congressional policy, the court 
found relevant the allegation by the franchisee that Amoco had given 
its other franchisees the opportunity "to correct their transgressions 
before they are terminated."1i4 Gilderhus purportedly had not been 
given this opportunity. At issue was the plaintiff's purchase and sale 
of small amounts of petroleum products not originating from Amoco 
in breach of the franchise agreement.1i1i This was a terminating event 
under section 2802(b)(2)(C) and (c)(10).1i6 In granting Gilderhus' mo-
tion for a preliminary injunction, the district court stated that "[i]f 
plaintiff's assertions [of discriminatory termination] ... can be 
proven at trial, it is likely that the termination would be found inva-
lid, since it would be contrary to the very purpose and policies of the 
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. . . ."1i7 The court thus read into 
section 2802(b)(2)(C) a requirement that a franchisee be given an op-
•• [d. § 2802(c)(10). 
00 [d. § 2802(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added) . 
• , [d. § 2802(b)(2)(B)(ii); S. REP. No. 731, supra note 8, at 892 . 
•• Guilderhus v. Amoco Oil Co., 470 F. Supp. 1302 (D. Minn. 1979) . 
•• [d. at 1305 (quoting S. REP. No. 731, supra note 8, at 876). 
54 [d . 
.. [d. 
oe [d . 
•• [d. 
HeinOnline -- 7 J. Energy L. & Pol’y 248 1986
248 JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 7 
portunity to cure an event which is cause for termination under that 
section if the franchisor has afforded such an opportunity to its other 
franchisees. Ci8 
More recently, the Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals 
have considered the question of cure under sections 2802(b)(2)(A) 
and 2802(b)(2)(C).Ci9 In Wisser Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,60 the Second 
Circuit held that neither section 2802(b)(2)(A) nor section 
2802(b)(2)(C) require that a franchisee be afforded an opportunity to 
cure.61 In that case the plaintiff-franchisee had its franchise termi-
nated for selling non-Mobil gasoline as a Mobil product.62 The ques-
tion presented was whether either the parties' franchise agreement or 
the PMPA required notice of default and an opportunity to cure.63 
The court concluded that although the parties' contract generally re-
quired notice and an opportunity to cure, a rider permitted immedi-
ate termination in the event of misbranding.6• As for the franchisee's 
rights under the PMP A, the Second Circuit first noted that "mis-
branding is a ground for termination under 15 U.S.C. §§ 
2802(b)(2)(A), 2802(b)(2)(C), 2802(c)(1O) and 2802(c)(1l) .... "6Ci 
Writing for the court, Chief Judge Feinberg noted that "[n]othing in 
these provisions ... requires an opportunity to cure. "66 He 
continued: 
In contrast, § 2802(b)(2)(B), a parallel provision permitting termina-
tion for 'failure. . . to exert good faith efforts to carry out the pro-
visions of the franchise,' requires the franchisor to apprise the fran-
chisee 'in writing of such failure' and to afford 'a reasonable 
opportunity to exert good faith efforts to carry out such provisions,' 
and allows termination only if the franchisee continues its failure to 
exercise good faith efforts. . . . Similarly, in connection with nonre-
newal based on receipt of numerous customer complaints related to 
the condition of the premises ... , the PMPA confers on the fran-
.S Compare Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Waldman, 515 F. Supp. 477, 485 (M.D. Pa. 
1981) (no evidence of discriminatory termination under section 2802(b)(2)(A» . 
•• Wisser Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 730 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1984); Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 
F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1985). Excluded from this discussion are those cases involving "any failure 
beyond the reasonable control of the franchisee," a statutorily excluded type of "failure" under 
15 U.S.C. § 2801(13). See, e.g., Sun Refining & Marketing Co. v. Rago, 741 F.2d 670, 672-74 (3d 
Cir. 1984). See also infra notes 103-105 and accompanying text . 
•• Wisser Co., 730 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1984) . 
• , Id. at 59 . 
•• Id. at 56-57 . 
•• Id. at 57 . 
•• Id. at 58 . 
•• Id . 
•• Id. 
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chisee a right to notice and an opportunity to cure or correct. 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2802(b)(3)(B) and 2802(b)(3)(C). 
It is clear from the structure of the statute that Congress meant to 
give franchisees the right to cure for some kinds of conduct or condi-
tions that if continued would warrant termination or nonrenewal, 
but did not intend to require a second chance for other kinds of 
conduct or conditions .... While the legislative history does £on-
template "[f]lexibility ... so that the franchisor may work with a 
franchisee in an effort to correct the situation and avoid termination 
... , it also recognizes that '[slome contractual violations, although 
not readily reducible to a dollar value, may be so serious as to un-
dermine the entire relationship, . . .' 
249 
The misbranding alleged in this case falls into the latter category.67 
The Second Circuit thus held that no opportunity to cure was re-
quired in connection with franchise terminations for misbranding 
under sections 2802(b)(2)(A) and 2802(b)(2)(C).s8 
The Seventh Circuit was presented with a similar issue in Lippo v. 
Mobil Oil Corp.S9 Lippo had purchased non-Mobil gasoline and in 
turn sold it as a Mobil product.70 Mobil gave Lippo notice of termi-
nation pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 2802(b)(2)(A) and 2802(b)(2)(C),71 to 
which Lippo responded that he had a right to cure.72 In addressing 
Lippo's contention, the court began by distinguishing the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Wisser Co. While the court conceded that the con-
tract provisions in both cases were "virtually identical,"73 the Sev-
enth Circuit did not find Wisser dispositive.7• On the contrary, the 
court distinguished Wisser principally on the basis of its own reading 
of the controlling contract provisions.7Ii The court, speaking through 
.7 Id. at 58-59 (citations omitted) . 
•• Id. at 59. For additional cases where an opportunity to cure was not given in connection 
with franchise terminations under 15 U.S.C. §§ 2802(b)(2)(A) and 2802(b)(2)(C), see JFC In-
vestors Ltd. v. Gulf Products Div. of BP Oil, 608 F. Supp. 1136, 1141-43 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (mis-
branding); Amoco Oil Co. v. D.Z. Enterprises Inc., 607 F. Supp. 595, 600-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); 
H.R.H. Service Station, Inc. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 591 F. Supp. 25,26 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Itin Oil 
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 527 F. Supp. 898, 900-01 (E.n. Mich. 1981); Haynes v. Exxon Co., 
U.S.A., 512 F. Supp. 543, 544 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (termination for misbranding) . 
•• Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1985). 
70 I d. at 708. 
71 Id. at 709, 721. 
,. Id. at 709. 
7. Id. at 711. 
,. Id. at 712-13. 
,. Id. at 712-16. The court also noted that contract provisions of franchise agreements gov-
erned by the PMPA are to be interpreted according to state contract law. Thus, unless relevant 
Illinois contract law and New York contract law were identical, the Wisser decision would not 
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Judge Cudahy, read the parties' franchise agreement as allowing ter-
mination without notice for certain violations of the franchise, such 
as misbranding.76 However, according to the court, a "violation" as 
defined under the Lippo-Mobil franchise agreement was an "uncor-
rected default."77 Thus, Lippo had the contractual right to cure his 
default.78 Since, in the court's view, he had cured his default by cov-
ering over Mobil signs, it never became a contractual "violation;" and 
Mobil had no right to terminate the franchise. 79 
In a vigorous dissent,80 Judge Posner framed the underlying issue 
as "whether a rational franchisor would, and whether this rational 
franchisor did, empower his dealers to defraud him by attaching his 
trademark to another supplier's product."81 In Judge Posner's view, 
since every commercial contract imposes a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance, the contractual right of cure was condi-
tional upon Lippo's having acted in good faith in defaulting on his 
contractual obligations.82 Considering that Lippo "committed a pal-
pable and" potentially very harmful fraud against Mobil by deliber-
ately selling another supplier's gas under Mobil's name,"83 Lippo 
breached his duty of good faith performance, according to Judge Pos-
ner. In addition, Judge Posner noted the near impossibility of curing 
the type of default committed by Lippo, given that Mobil gas would 
be mixed with another supplier's gas in the storage tank.8• "If this 
was not misbranding, which it probably was, it was adulteration -
which is forbidden along with misbranding," Judge Posner 
observed.8Ci 
Finally, Judge Posner found the majority's interpretation of the 
franchise agreement to be inconsistent with the Second Circuit's de-
cision in Wisser.86 What was of particular interest in this connection 
was the Second Circuit's conclusion in Wisser that the PMP A did 
not give a franchisee an opportunity to cure misbranding. In Judge 
be dispositive, according to the court. [d. at 712. 7. [d. at 713-14. 
77 [d. at 714. 
7. [d. 
70 [d. The court reached this conclusion by applying the principle of contra proferentum. [d. 
at 714-15 . 
•• Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706, 722 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting) . 
• , [d. at 726 . 
•• [d. at 723 . 
• s [d. at 722 . 
.. [d. at 724 . 
•• [d. at 724-25. As noted by Judge Posner, "The adulteration was not cured within ten days; 
it may never be cured, though it will decay exponentially .... " [d. at 725 . 
.. [d. at 725. 
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Posner's opmIOn, "it is possible in theory that the Act [which is 
designed to protect only the franchisee] would give a franchisee fewer 
rights than the franchise contract; it just is completely unrealistic."87 
The Posner dissent in Lippo hits the mark on at least tWQ. counts. 
First, regarding Lippo's good faith, the law in Illinois is clear: "Every 
contract implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it, 
and where an instrument is susceptible of two conflicting construc-
tions, one which imputes bad faith to one of the parties and the other 
does not, the latter construction should be adopted."88 The majority's 
interpretation of the Lippo-Mobil franchise agreement permits Lippo 
to act in apparent bad faith and yet evade termination of his 
franchise with Mobil. In light of Lippo's apparent bad faith conduct, 
basic Illinois contract law, on which the majority placed great reli-
ance,89 strongly suggests that the franchise-agreement's termination 
provisions in this instance should have been interpreted in Mobil's 
favor.90 
Second, and more importantly, Judge Posner's criticism of the ma-
jority's failure to interpret the Lippo-Mobil franchise in light of the 
PMP A 91 is well taken. In Illinois the law is well settled "that, in the 
absence of language to the contrary, laws and statutes in existence at 
the time a contract is executed are considered a part of the contract 
as though they were expressly incorporated therein. "92 Considering 
the protective purpose of the PMP A, the Act "may confer greater 
rights on a franchisee than are granted in a particular franchise 
agreement."93 The converse, however, seems improbable, particularly 
considering that franchise agreements are, by and large, contracts of 
adhesion drafted by franchisors.94 Had the majority in Lippo inter-
preted the Lippo-Mobil franchise agreement in light of the PMPA, it 
87 [d. at 726. Judge Posner summed up his dissent by observing that "twisting a contract to 
help the little man who is dishonest hurts the little man who is honest .... [The majority's 
opinion) will confirm the widespread view in the business community ... that contemporary 
American law is unintelligible and unjust, and, not least, will set back the cause of purposive 
and realistic contract interpretation." [d. at 726-27. 
ss Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat'l Bank, 15 Ill. 2d 272, 154 N.E.2d 683 (1958). 
S. Lippa, 776 F.2d at 712-15. 
•• See id. at 708 n.2 . 
•• Lippa, 776 F.2d at 726 (Posner, J., dissenting) . 
•• S&D Service, Inc. v. 915-925 W. Schubert Condominium Ass'n, 132 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 478 
N.E.2d 478, 483 (1985). See Rehart v. Clark, 448 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir. 1971) ("It is well 
settled that existing laws are read into contracts in order to fix the rights and obligations of the 
parties"). See also Hatcho Corp. v. Della Pietra, 195 Conn. 18, 485 A.2d 1285, 1288 (1985); 
Winter v. Liles, 354 N.W.2d 70, 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Cary v. Cary, 675 S.W.2d 491 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1984). 
•• Wisser, 730 F.2d at 58 . 
•• See S. REP. No. 731, supra note 8, at 864-66. 
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seems highly unlikely that they would have concluded that Lippo 
had a right to cure his misbranding. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the absence of discriminatory treatment by a franchisor of a 
franchisee, vis-a-vis the franchisor's other franchisees,95 the PMPA 
does not require that franchisees be given a formal. opportunity to 
cure before a franchise is terminated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 
2802(b)(2)(A) or 2802(b)(2)(C). The structure of the Act shows that 
Congress intended to give franchisees the right to cure for some types 
of conduct that if continued would warrant termination, but not for 
other more serious kinds of conduct.96 Terminations under these two 
sections are for serious franchise violations, not minor or mere tech-
nical violations, but the kind of violations which "undermine the en-
tire relationship."97 As the Second Circuit concluded in Wisser, mis-
branding of gasoline falls into the latter category.98 
Regarding an alleged contractual right to cure serious breaches or 
defaults such as fuel· misbranding, the Seventh Circuit's decision in 
Lippo falls wide of the mark. The franchise agreement in Lippo was 
virtually identical with the agreement in the Wisser decision,99 which 
the Second Circuit concluded conferred no right on the franchisee to 
cure misbranding. loo In addition, the majority in Lippo also neglected 
to interpret the franchise agreement in light of the PMP A. 101 The 
Act, even though highly protective of vulnerable franchisees, does not 
confer a right to cure misbranding. l02 Given this consideration, it 
seems improbable that Mobil, the party which drafted the franchise 
agreement, intended to give its franchisees greater rights under con-
tract than they enjoyed under statute. 
In the final analysis, it may be possible to harmonize the Seventh 
Circuit's decision in Lippo with the Wisser decision and the PMP A if 
Lippo's admitted misbranding is characterized as a failure "for a 
cause beyond the reasonable control of the franchisee. "103 As such, it 
•• See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text . 
•• S. REP. No. 731, supra note 8, at 891-97. See Wisser, 730 F.2d at 59 . 
... S. REP. No. 731, supra note 8, at 876. See 15 U.S.C. § 2801(13), which excludes technical or 
unimportant failures from the definition of franchisee failures. 
•• Wisser, 730 F.2d at 59 . 
.. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra notes 86-87 and 91-94 and accompanying text. 
10' See supra cases cited at note 68. 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 2801(13). 
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would not be a statutory failure under the PMP A.lo. As noted by the 
Lippo majority, "Lippo's one-time use of non-Mobil gasoline oc-
curred during a period of gasoline shortage when Lippo apparently 
feared he would have no gas to sell to his customers. "1011 While this 
explanation arguably qualifies as a cause for purchasing non-Mobil 
gasoline beyond Lippo's reasonable control, it does not explain or ex-
cuse Lippo's sale for one day of non-Mobil gasoline as a Mobil prod-
uct.106 Although the majority did not expressly so state, it seems 
fairly evident from the tenor of their opinion that they viewed this 
particular instance of misbranding as merely a technical failure, and 
thus excluded as a statutory "failure" under 15 U.S.C. § 2801(13)(A). 
Regardless of the majority's rationale in Lippo, "linguistic subtlety 
is in any event out of place in interpreting this contract. It is not a 
contract between lexicographers; it was not drawn to provide herme-
neutical exercises for judges."107 In short, the majority's reading of 
the franchise agreement in Lippo is strained and at odds with the 
clear guidance furnished by Congress on this score. The scope of the 
Lippo opinion should be closely circumscribed. 
104 See supra note 59. 
10. Lippo, 776 F.2d at 708 n.4. 
108 See id. at 708. Lippo covered the Mobil signs and pumps only after being so directed by a 
Mobil representative. Id. 
107 Id. at 725 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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